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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH by and 
through its Treasurer, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
— vs. — 
SPEING CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, and HYEUM JENSEN, its 
Mayor, CLAUDE ACOED, EOYAL 
ALLBED, CUTLEE SCHOFIELD, 
HENEY SCHOFIELD and VIEGUS 
OSBOENE, its Councilmen, and 
CHARLES A. THOMPSEN, EOYAL 
ALLEED, VIEGUS OSBOENE, 
MAX BLAIN, LOWELL HANSEN, 
ALLEN BECK and HENEY BLAIN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BEIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree in 
favor of the several defendants, respondents here, entered 
and filed October 24,1952 (E. pp. 46, 47), based upon the 
trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law (E. pp. 33-45) and dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
as well as declaring certain bonds issued by the defend-
ant Spring City to be unconstitutional, void, and un-
civil No. 7942 
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collectible. For convenience the parties will be referred 
to as they appeared in the court below. 
After a pre-trial, at which witnesses were sworn 
and testified, the case was submitted to the trial court 
for determination and decision by all parties upon the 
record there made. No jury was called or impaneled. 
PLEADINGS 
The complaint, as amended (K. pp. 26-30) alleged 
that the defendant Spring City, a municipal corporation, 
on January 15,1948, issued, in a series of that date, nego-
tiable coupon general obligation power and light bonds 
in the face amount of $12,000.00, and in the form set forth 
as the complaint's exhibit "A"; that to the bonds were 
attached coupons for interest; and that the plaintiff, 
the State of Utah, by its Commission of Finance, paid 
the sum of $13,498.67 for those bonds, representing 
principal, premium, and accrued interest; that the money 
was received by defendant Spring City, and used for 
corporate purposes. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants, Charles A. Thompsen, as mayor, Koyal Allred, 
Virgus Osborne, Max Blain, Lowell Hansen and Allen 
Beck, as councilmen, and Henry Blain as recorder, were 
the duly elected, qualified and acting holders of those 
respective offices as they were constituted in the month 
of January 1948. All of the foregoing allegations were 
conceded, and incorporated into the findings. 
The complaint further alleged, in six counts, grounds 
for relief upon the following causes of action: One, de-
fault in the payment of interest upon presentation of 
2 
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certain coupons as they matured; Two, an assertion by 
the council of Spring City to the effect that the bonds 
to which the coupons were attached were themselves void; 
Three, that the State of Utah paid the sum of $13,498.67 
to the defendant Spring City under a mistake of fact, 
which mistake arose from the misrepresentation by the 
several individual defendants, then officials of the de-
fendant Spring City, of certain material facts affecting 
the constitutionality of the disputed issue; Four, that 
those officials falsely and negligently misrepresented 
the facts upon which the alleged mistake was made; Five, 
that the defendant Henry Blain, City Eecorder in Janu-
ary, 1948, misrepresented the financial condition of the 
city, upon which representation the plaintiff relied, to its 
detriment, and, in the event the disputed securities be 
declared void, to its damage; Six, that the defendant 
Spring City had and received from, to the use of, and 
therefore owes, the plaintiff, State of Utah, the sum of 
$13,498.67. 
Separate answers were filed by the defendant Spring 
City, and by the several individual defendants, who joined 
in one answer. Spring City in its answer denied that 
general obligation bonds, or legal bonds of any kind, were 
issued; denied that there was a fraudulent or actionable 
misrepresentation, and alleged that the bonds were void, 
having been issued pursuant to no election by qualified 
taxpayers and electors, and that the bonds were not 
within the revenues of the year in which issued. That 
there are no funds presently or potentially available 
through taxation or otherwise for the payment of the 
3 
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alleged debt The defendant Spring City counterclaimed 
for interest theretofore paid by that defendant to the 
plaintiff. 
In the joint answer of the several individual de-
fendants, they deny the validity of the bonds; deny gen-
erally any actionable misrepresentation, or that there 
was any mistake or fraud in the inducement of the pur-
chase of these bonds, and deny generally that the plain-
tiff states a claim against the individual defendants upon 
which relief might be granted; that the action is barred as 
against those defendants by the provisions of Section 104-
2-24 (3) and Section 104-2-24.10, UCA 1943. [Now 78-
12-26 (3) and (4) UCA 1953] Two of the individual de-
fendants, however, by express reservation in their an-
swer, do not deny the validity of the bond's. Those de-
fendants, Royal Allred and Virgus Osborne, were in 1948, 
and now are, members of the city council of the defend-
ant Spring City. 
Issue was joined upon the validity of the bonds, the 
validity of coupons thereon, the presence of a cause of 
action for money had and received, and the personal 
liability of the several individual defendants. 
PROCEEDINGS 
At the pre-trial hearing, the mayor, members of the 
city council and the recorder of the defendant Spring 
City, as those offices were constituted at the time of the 
issuance of the questioned securities, were sworn and 
testified. Exhibits were submitted, stipulated to and ad-
mitted into evidence. The evidence adduced by the exam-
4 
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ination of the several witnesses was, as far as is material 
here, incontroverted.' •  
The Honorable L. Leland Larson, District Judge of 
the Seventh Judicial District, conducted pre-trial pro-
ceedings October 17, 1951. The pre-trial proceedings 
were continued until November 9, 1951, the court re-
quiring the attendance of all defendants for examination 
upon the pre-trial. On November 9, 1951, the matter was 
submitted for decision and determination by the trial 
court. 
EVIDENCE 
The facts before the court are substantially as fol-
lows : The defendant Spring City, is a duly incorporated 
city of the third class in Sanpete County, Utah. In the 
year 1947, the assessed valuation of defendant Spring 
City was $179,407.00. The proposed 1948 budget of the 
defendant Spring City, (Defendant's Exhibit 1) a public 
hearing upon passage of which was held December 13, 
1947, lists expenditures anticipated in the year 1948 in the 
aggregate sum of $16,091.08, exclusive of an anticipated 
expenditure of $15,000.00 for "an electric plant pipeline" 
(line 40, Def. Sp. City's Exhibit 1) the cost of which was 
to have been obtained from "revenue on electric pipe 
bonds $20,000.00." (line 18, Def. Exhibit 1) Among other 
proposed expenditures was a payment of $5,100.00, 
termed in defendant's Exhibit 1 as "Ephraim Bank bond 
and interest". (Def. Exhibit 1, line 39) 
As found by the trial court, the revenues of the city 
in the year 1948 equalled $20,284.44. 
'"TPursuant to a resolution (State's Exhibit B) of Janu-
5 
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ary 5, 1948, duly passed by the unanimous affirmative 
vote of all councilmen, and for the recited consideration 
of an "immediate, imperative and pressing need of raising 
funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the purpose of ex-
tending and improving the power and light plant to be 
owned and controlled by the city" (paragraph, 1, p. 2, 
State's Exhibit B), the city issued its bonds designated 
City of Spring City Power and Light Bond Series of 
January 15, A. D. 1948 in the face amount of $12,000.00 
in the following form: 
UNITED STATES OF AMEBIC A 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY 
CITY OF SPRING CITY 
Power and Light Bond 
Series of January 15, A. D. 1948 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the City of Spring City, in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, hereby acknowledges itself 
to be indebted and for value received, hereby 
promises to pay to the bearer hereof the sum of 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) in law-
ful money of the United States of America, on the 
15th day of January, , at the Bank of Eph-
raim, Ephraim, Utah, with interest thereon at the 
rate of three and one-half percent (3%%) per an-
num from date until paid, payable annually in like 
money on the fifteenth day of January in each 
year, said interest to maturity being represented 
by interest coupons hereto attached. 
This bond is one of a series of twelve (12) 
6 
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bonds of like date and amount, numbered from (1) 
to twelve (12) inclusive, for the aggregate sum 
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) issued 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 15-8-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, and all other laws thereto 
enabling. 
It is hereby certified, recited and. declared 
that the entire indebtedness of said City hereby 
incurred, together with all other indebtedness in-
curred by said City for and during the year 1948, 
is not in excess of the taxes levied or to be levied 
for the current year. 
It is hereby further certified, recited and de 
clared that all conditions, acts, and things essential 
to the validity of this bond exist, have happened 
and have been done, and that every requirement of 
law affecting the issue thereof has been duly com-
plied with, and this bond is within every debt and 
other limits prescribed by the Constitution and 
laws of -said State and that the full faith and credit 
of said Spring City are hereby irrevocably pledged 
to the punctual payment of the principal and in-
terest of this bond according to its terms. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said Spring City 
has caused this bond to be signed by its Mayor, 
its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed, and at-
tested by its City Recorder, and the annexed cou-
pons to bear the facsimile signature of the City 
Treasurer, as of the 15th day of January, A. D., 
1948. 
(s) Charles A. Thompson 
Mayor 
ATTEST: 
(s) Henry Blaine 
City Recorder 
(SEAL) 
7 
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The official capacity and the signatures of the per-
sons signing the resolution and the bonds are not dis-
puted. 
None of the bonds were to mature until the year 
1961. (Plaintiff's exhibit D-l through D-12, photostatic 
copies of the bonds, and Plaintiff's exhibit B, the author-
izing resolution). It is manifestly evident from the audit 
conducted (Plaintiff's exhibit F) and from the testimony, 
that the purpose of protracting amortization and dis-
charge of the debt for the period of some 13 years was 
to enable the defendant Spring City to discharge existing 
indebtedness. Schedule " 1 " of the audit (Pis. Exhibit F) 
discloses that in the year 1961 there will remain oniy 
$1,300.00 of general obligations of Spring City, exclu-
sive of the disputed issue. In the testimony of Virgus 
Osborne, councilman in January 1948, beginning at line 
18, page 91 of the transcript, the purpose of deferring 
the debt until 1961, it clearly shows, was in order to en-
able the City to conveniently meet all payments of princi-
Question: What impression did you have, as to 
what kind of bonds you were consider-
ing? 
Answer: I thought they were revenue bonds. 
Question: Why? 
Answer: For one reason that on the $13,000.00 
and the $12,000.00 that we borrowed, 
was about—and $13,000.00 was paid 
off to the Bank of Ephraim, and these 
others were not to be paid until these 
were all paid up, that is this $12,000.00 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue was not to be paid on, until the 
other issue was paid. 
Interest was to be paid annually from date of issu-
ance of the bonds until maturity of the bond to which cou-
pons were annexed for interest payments. (Plaintiff's 
exhibit C, photostatic copies of the coupons) 
On January 27, 1948, the plaintiff, State of Utah, by 
its Commission of Finance, purchased the bonds for the 
sum of $13,498.67 representing principal, premium and 
accrued interest, all such sum being paid from the per-
manent school fund of the State Land Board. (K. p. 39) 
Until January 15, 1950, the defendant, Spring City, paid 
all interest payments as they became due and payable. 
On January 15, 1951, the state treasurer presented for 
payment the coupons of said bonds then payable in the 
total amount of $420.00. Payment was refused and no 
payment or portion thereof has been made thereon. The 
defendant Spring City, and its present mayor and council-
men maintain that the bounds and coupons are void. 
They have refused and continue to refuse to make pay-
ment upon the interest coupons. 
The trial court entered its findings of fact to the 
effect that the plaintiff held unpaid bonds issued by 
Spring City in the sum of $14,500.00 in addition to the is-
sue of $12,000.00 subject of this litigation. (R. p. 41) The 
trial court found that the proceeds of the bond issue now 
in dispute were used for corporate purposes to the extent 
of $12,000.00 and that $1,398.67 was retained by Lauren 
W. Gibbs as his commission for the sale of the bonds pur-
suant to an agreement between Gibbs and Spring City. 
9 
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(B. p. 43) The trial court found further that the de-
fendant Spring City did not have on hand any funds for 
the payment of the face amount of the bond's in the year 
1948, (R. p. 40) but found, rather, from an audit (State's 
Exhibit F) conducted by Wood, Child, Mann & Smith, 
accountants, that the defendant Spring City incurred a 
deficit in the year 1948 in the sum of $2,067.90. (E. p. 40) 
The audit from which that finding was made however, has 
incorporated "proceeds from bond issues—$24,766.33" in 
the receipts column, and "$27,140.78 operation and main-
tenance—material" in the expenditure column. (Exhibit 
C of the audit, State's Exhibit F) It is submitted that the 
court erred in finding a $2,067.90 deficit to have been in-
curred. The audit reflects proceeds of bond issues and 
expenditures from bond issue funds, neither of which 
have any bearing in a determination of current revenue 
f and current expenditures as those terms are contem-
plated by the constitutional limits upon debt. 
Based upon the finding that the "expenditures" for 
the year 1948 exceeded the "revenues" as the figure rep-
resenting each appeared in the audit, the court concluded 
as a matter of law that Article XIV, Section 3 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah had been violated. Up-
on the finding that the existing debt of $14,500.00, plus 
the debt, subject of this litigation, of $12,000.00, ex-
ceeded twelve percent of the valuation of taxable property 
in the city's corporate limits, as taken from the last as-
sessment for city purposes, the trial court concluded that 
Section 4, Article XIV of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah also was violated. 
10 
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The court further found that the individual defend 
ants did not falsely or negligently represent to the plain-
tiff that all conditions, acts and things essential to the 
validity of the bonds existed, had happened, and had been 
done, and that if plaintiff did not know the financial con-
dition of Spring City and did not know whether the bonds 
issued were within the constitutional debt limits, it should 
have known (E. pp. 40 & 41); and that the defendants 
were entitled to rely upon the opinion of the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, and the legal advice of the 
defendants' bond broker and his attorney as to the valid-
ity of the bonds. (E. p. 42) The court found that although 
the bonds show upon their face that they purport to be 
within the revenues of the year 1948, yet the bond pro-
ceedings authorizing the $12,000.00 bond issue do not pro-
vide for any tax or any other method for payment there-
of. (E. p. 41) The court further found that the State of 
Utah was negligent in failing to determine the financial 
condition of Spring City in the year 1948. Upon those 
findings and conclusion's, the court entered its decree 
that the plaintiff, State of Utah, is entitled to recover 
nothing on either of its causes of action against either or 
any of the defendants and that the Power and Light 
Bonds, Series of January 15, A.D. 1948, in the sum of 
$12,000.00 are, as are the coupons thereupon, unconsti-
tutional, void and uncollectible. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED 
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY, ARE CONSTITUTION-
AL AND VALID. 
1. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 3, 
Constitution of Utah, was not exceeded. 
2. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 4, 
was not exceeded. 
POINT II 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF DEFENDANT SPRING CITY 
WAS AUTHORIZED AND EMPOWERED TO BORROW, UPON 
NEGOTIABLE BONDS, FUNDS TO BE USED FOR CORPOR-
ATE PURPOSES. 
POINT III 
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE 
VOID IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING 
THAT ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
UPON THE THEORY OF MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. 
POINT IV 
IF THE BOND ISSUE IS VOID, THE PLAINTIFF MAY 
RECOVER AGAINST THE ISSUING AUTHORITIES BE-
CAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THOSE OFFICIALS IN 
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, ISSUED 
BY THE DEFENDANT SPRING CITY ARE CONSTITUTION-
AL AND VALID. 
T h e t r i a l court , in it's f indings of fact and conclusions 
of law, de te rmined tha t the bonds issued by S p r i n g City, 
ser ies of and da ted J a n u a r y 15, 1948, were in excess of 
the debt l imit imposed by Art ic le X I V , Sections 3 and 4, 
12 
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of the Constitution of the State of Utah, since no election 
at which the proposition to create the debt here disputed 
was •submitted to the qualified and taxpaying electors. 
1. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 3, 
Constitution of Utah, was not exceeded. 
Article XIV, Section 3 of the Constitution, reads 
as follows : 
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current 
year shall be created by any county or subdivision 
thereof, or by any school district therein, or by any 
cit} ,^ town or village, or any subdivision thereof 
in this State; unless the proposition to create such 
debt, shall have been submitted to a vote of such 
qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax 
therein, in the year preceding such election, and a 
majority of those voting thereon •shall have voted 
in favor of incurring such debt. 
The trial court found that in the year 1948 the ex-
penditures of the defendant Spring City exceeded its 
revenues by the sum of $2,067.90 as shown by an audit. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit F) 
At this point, we will assert that exception is taken 
to that finding, inasmuch a-s the audit has incorporated 
into the receipts and expenditures account, items which 
have no bearing upon the determination of the constitu-
tional question of what is "current revenue" within the 
meaning of that term. The audit has included, on the 
"receipts" side of the account from which the court's find-
ing was made, an item denominated "proceeds from bond 
issues—$24,766.33;" and on the "expenditures" side of 
the same account, there appears "operation and main-
tenance—material—$27,140.78." 
13 
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Both of those items should be excluded from anj 
accounting, the purpose of which is to ascertain the 
amount of current revenue over current expenditures. 
After this revision alone, the audit would then show that 
revenues for the year 1948 exceeded the expenditures 
by the sum of $306.55. However, for reasons to be dis-
cussed hereinafter, we take the position that the overall 
relationship of expenditure to revenue is not material 
if the obligation disputed is incurred in fact before ex-
penditures and obligations being currently created have 
TBSk in the critical year, exceeded the potential revenues 
for the entire year. We therefore will not argue at this 
time the propriety of the trial court's finding that a de-
ficit, speaking in terms of the questions with which we 
are now concerned, in fact occurred. 
Upon that finding of a deficit, however, the trial 
court proceeded to determine that the municipality of 
Spring City had created a debt in excess of its revenue 
(including taxes for the year 1948), and that therefore, 
all outstanding obligation's incurred in that year, remain-
ing unpaid at the expiration thereof, became and were, 
ab initio, unconstitutional and void. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
by the court. Included therein was a preamble in which 
the trial judge cites the case Fritch vs. Board of Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 83, 47 Pac. 1026. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in 
its application of the Fritch case to the facts here, in-
validating the disputed bonds for the reason that Spring 
City expended more in 1948 than its revenues equaled 
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in that year. This holding becomes particularly objection-
able when it appears that the claim of the State of Utah, 
purchasers of the disputed bonds, became fixed and 
definite upon January 15th, 1948. We submit that on 
January 15th, the 1948 debt limit of Spring City could not 
have been exceeded, even after applying to the sum of 
expenditures made and obligations incurred as a charge 
against 1948 revenue's up to January 15, the further sum 
of $13,498.67, the amount paid by plaintiff for the bonds 
we now consider. The total revenue of the City for the 
year 1948 was the sum of $20,284.44. (K. p. 40) The word 
"taxes" in the constitutional provision above cited has 
been construed to mean "all potential revenues for the 
current year, from whatever source obtainable." Muir vs. 
Murray City, 55 Utah 368,186 Pac. 433. 
Moreover, we submit that by express recitation in the 
proceedings preliminary to the issuance of these bonds, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit B, [resolution authorizing bonds] p. 
2) there was an "immediate, imperative and pressing 
need of raising funds to the amount of $12,000.00 for the 
purpose of extending and improving the power and light 
plant to be owned and controlled by the city in order to 
better serve the inhabitants," and that the further recita-
tion that "the sum of $12,000.00 may be raised at this 
time without incurring any indebtedness or liability 
by said city in excess of the revenue of the said city for 
the current year, 1948," contained in the resolution passed 
by the Spring City council January 5, 1948, (State's Ex-
hibit B) was a statement to the effect that the procure-
ment of $12,000.00 was immediate, imperative and press-
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ing to the extent of being a required expenditure in the 
year 1948. We contend further that the recital therein, 
to the effect that in procuring that amount, the City would 
not exceed the revenues of the City for the current year, 
1948, was an implied, if not an express covenant on the 
part of the city council to forebear from a diversion of 
funds which might become available for the payment of 
these bonds. It would clearly appear that it became in-
cumbent upon the city council after entering into that 
covenant, that they would not do any acts, allow any ap-
propriations, or make any disbursements subsequent to 
the execution of that covenant which would destroy, alter 
or abridge their power and authority to create that debt. 
A purchaser of municipal bonds is entitled to rely upon 
a covenant of that tenor and import, and innocent holders 
may not be trapped by a subsequent diversion of funds 
in breach of that covenant. 
It appears from the audit, (State's Exhibit P) that in 
the year 1948 there was paid to an obligee unnamed there-
in, the sum of $5,000.00 for a "tax anticipation note". It is 
conceivable, though not in evidence, that that disburse-
ment might have been unauthorized, and ultra vires for 
the reason that the obligation might itself have been void, 
as having been incurred in the year 1947 (or prior years) 
after the city had exceeded its debt limit by having ex-
pended in excess of its revenues for that year. If that 
expenditure was not a valid obligation, it could not have 
taken precedence over the obligation incurred by the is-
suance of the instant bonds. 
We take further exception to the trial court's appli-
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cation of the Fritch case to the facts here, particularly ii 
light of a case decided immediately after the Fritch case, 
Pleasant Valley Coal Company vs. County Commis-
sioners, Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 97, 48 Pac. 1032. In 
that case the question was upon the liability of the county 
to pay to the plaintiff the price agreed for coal delivered 
in the month of December, 1896. In 1897 a claim therefor 
was presented by the plaintiff. Contention of the county 
commissioners was that at the time of the furnishing of 
the coal the county had already exceeded its limit of in-
debtedness. The court said: 
The material question to be determined is 
whether at the time of the furnishing of the coal, 
Salt Lake County had already exceeded the limit 
of its indebtedness which it was allowed to create 
by law. 
Although the question in that case involved the effect of 
the Constitution of Utah becoming operative during a 
fiscal period in which the debt limit of the county was 
disputed, the ratio decidendi of that case is still to the 
effect that the validity of an obligation is determined not 
as of the end of the year but as of the time when the lia-
bility is incurred. The court there said: 
To refuse to acknowledge and pay a just debt 
is a thing to be discouraged and should not be 
aided by judicial construction. Such thinking dis-
pels confidence, ruins credit and casts a reproach 
upon government. # * * Counsel for the appellant 
insists that some of the questions raised in this 
record was decided in the case of Fritch vs. Board 
15 Utah 83 [hereinabove cited] and, it appears, 
adversely to the views herein expressed * * * that 
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case, while it affected the same warrants was im-
perfectly before the court and therefore cannot 
be regarded as conclusive in this and insofar as it 
conflicts herewith is hereby overruled. 
It is respectfully submitted that, although not affirm-
atively stated in the decision of the Pleasant Valley Coal 
Co. case, one of the views of the Fritch case to be over-
ruled was the disregard in the Fritch case of the question 
as to the financial condition of the county at the time the 
liability was incurred. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted to this court 
that at the time these bonds were issued, January 15, 
1948, the city of Spring City had not exceeded its consti-
tutional debt limit; nor had it expended, disbursed, ap-
propriated or pledged funds in excess of its revenues 
for the year 1948, even after it had incurred an obligation 
to pay to the State of Utah the sum of $13,398.67. Spring 
City impliedly covenanted not to thereafter permit the di-
version of funds so as to invalidate this obligation, by re-
citing that they were within their debt limit. Their sub-
sequent acts of disbursement and acts of creating debt, 
not those authorizing this disputed debt, were ultra vires, 
unconstitutional and void. 
We submit that if, as of the date this obligation be-
came fixed, the debt was not in excess of the constitution-
al limit, then there is no objection to making the date 
for payment of those bonds a time in the future when the 
city could do so conveniently from the revenues from 
the system and from general taxes and after other exist-
ing general obligations and encumbrances upon utilities 
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of the city had been paid and satisfied. 
Appellant further excepts to the application of the 
Fritch case to the facts here, particularly in respect to 
the court's interpretation of that case as holding that 
No debt which cannot be paid from the reve-
nues of the current year shall be created without 
a bond election and that bonds issued by the city 
against the current revenues of the year and 
without a bond election are payable solely out of 
such current revenues and are unenforceable 
against the revenue's of any other year. (Taken 
from trial court's preamble to findings, R. p. 35) 
In Muir vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433, "tWs 
court said: 
This section of the constitution [Article XIV, 
Section 3] undoubtedly prohibits a municipality 
from creating an indebtedness in excess of the 
revenue for the current year unless the proposi-
tion is submitted to a vote of the qualified electors 
and approved by the majority thereof; but the 
inhibition goes only to the question of excess 
amount and not to the time of payment. / / the 
amount of indebtedness is limited to the revenue 
of the current year, we know of no constitutional 
objection to providing for payment after the year 
expires. (Italics added) 
In that case Murray City borrowed from the plaintiff 
the sum of $1200.00 payable in four annual instalments 
evidenced by four promissory notes, one payable in one 
year, one payable in two years, one in three years, and 
the last in four years. The defendant City had paid two 
of these notes as the same came due but thereafter re-
pudiated the remainder of the debt, and when sued there-
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on the defendant City counterclaimed for return of the 
payments made on the first two notes on the theory that 
the City by incurring such obligation and making it pay-
able in years subsequent to that in which the debt was in- * 
curred had violated Article XIV, Section 3 of the Consti-
tution in that no election had been held. No evidence 
was submitted on the question whether the $1,200 debt 
exceeded the anticipated or realized revenue of the year 
in which the debt was incurred. The court assumed, in 
the absence of proof, that the debt was within the antici-
pated revenue of the year, and held that the plaintiff 
should recover judgment against the City. We quote 
from the opinion of the court on page 372 of the Utah 
Keports: 
* * * If the amount of the indebtedness is 
limited to the revenue of the current year, we know 
of no constitutional objection to providing for 
payment after the year expires. * * * 
Although it is not clear from the opinion whether 
the later notes evidencing the debt were to be paid from 
income for years subsequent to that in which the debt was 
incurred, an examination of the abstract of the record 
and briefs of counsel before the Utah Supreme Court in-
dicate that in fact such was the case. 
In the case of Dickinson vs. Salt Lake City, et al, 
57 Utah 530, 195 P. 1110, the court again announced and 
followed this rule, "Any failure on the part of the city 
authorities to levy a tax necessary to repay such indebt-
edness could not defeat the indebtedness or render it 
any less a legal and binding obligation against the city 
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(cases cited)." In the case of Scott, County Auditor vs. 
Salt Lake County, et al, 58 Utah 25,196 P. 1022, the court 
once again cited and followed the Muir case. See page 28 
of the Utah Beports. It may thus be seen that the Utah 
Supreme Court has already ruled upon this question 
and has decided that the constitutional expression "no 
debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall 
be created" without an election is an inhibition which runs 
only to the incurring of the debt and not to the time of 
payment thereof. Inasmuch as the $12,000 debt created by 
Spring City January 15, 1948, was well within the reve-
nues for the year 1948, anticipated at that time, and was 
slightly more than half the revenues actually realized 
for the year 1948, we submit that the provision for re-
payment for such debt in later years, and the failure to 
provide a tax for retirement thereof, does not render 
the debt void. 
If then, the constitutional prohibition does not ex-
tend to the time of payment, it is immaterial that general 
obligations issued and created by a municipality include 
a provision for payment in a year subsequent to the 
year in which they are incurred. 
In 41 A.L.R. Page 810, the general rule respecting 
payment by municipalities for permanent improvements 
is stated thusly: 
Most courts hold that a [constitutional] provi-
sion against a municipality exceeding in any year 
its current revenue does not prevent it from pay-
ing for the construction of a permanent improve-
ment out of the revenue of a year subsequent to 
that in which it was erected if a contract on which 
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the claim is based was valid when it was made. 
The fact that for some reason the amount called 
for was not paid in the year in which the liability 
was incurred does not affect the right to recover 
it if the claim was originally a valid one. (Italics 
added) 
Thus, in Wilson vs. Gaston (1914) 141 Ga. 770, 82 
S. E. 136, wherein it appeared that a valid contract had 
been made and performed in 1912, but that the warrant 
issued to pay for the work done was not honored in that 
year, the court said: 
When the warrant fell due, all moneys in the 
treasury provided for its payment had been ap-
plied to other purposes, on account of unusual ex-
penses which the treasurer had paid indiscrimi-
nately, without any participation or consent upon 
the part of the Gallion Iron Works Company; and 
the warrant was not paid. I t was not contended 
that the commissioner was unauthorized to buy 
piping for constructing culverts in the public 
roads, but only that he was unauthorized to create 
a debt therefor within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. The validity of the contract was not destroy-
ed by reason of the diversion of the funds provided 
for its payment, under the circumstances above 
enumerated; but, notwithstanding such diversion, 
the obligation of the county to pay continued to 
exist. 
. . . After default in payment of the warrant the 
county was in the condition of having a valid, 
overdue obligation, and without funds to meet it. 
What was the duty of the county under these cir-
cumstances? The law provides that a tax may be 
levied to pay the legal indebtedness of a county 
due, or to become due during the year, or past due. 
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Civ. Code, Section 513 (1). 'When debts have ac-
cumulated against the county, so that 100 percent 
on the state tax, or the annual amount specially 
allowed by local law, cannot pay the current ex-
penses of the county and the debt in one year, they 
'shall pay off as rapidly as possible, at least 25 
per cent every year.' Civ. Code, Section 50?. The 
contention of the plaintiff, as presented by the 
pleadings and evidence, was that the debt could not 
be paid at all out of the taxes raised in 1913 [the 
year after the contract was executed]. I t was 
neither contended nor made to appear that the 
debts against the county were so large that this 
liability could not be paid in 1913. Under the fore-
going circumstances it appears that there was a 
legal liability against the county, no funds with 
which to meet it, but power in the commissioner 
to provide for its payment by levy of a tax in 
1913. The county authorities should levy a suffi-
cient tax and pay the debt. 
I t appears throughout the record, transcript and 
exhibits that the bonds here disputed were not to begin 
maturing until the year 1961. (State's Exhibits D-l 
through D-12, photostatic copies of the bonds, R. p. 33) 
This provision for payment at a date some 13 years in 
the future was for the purpose of allowing the city to 
amortize existing indebtedness and allow for the payment 
of these bonds after current bonded debt had been dis-
charged. (Tr. p. 91) In the official audit (State's Ex-
hibit F) there appears "Schedule Number 1" a statement 
of the bonded indebtedness of Spring City as of December 
31,194$ As appears from that schedule, in the year 1961 
there will remain total bonded debt, upon general obliga-
tions of the city, only $1,300.00, in addition to the in-
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debtedness disputed in this litigation. Section 10-8-87, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that a city may 
levy "not to exceed 3.5 mills to construct and maintain 
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines, state rail-
ways and bath houses." Section 10-7-9 provides that a 
city council may levy a tax sufficient to pay interest and 
to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of principal 
upon bonds issued for the purpose of supplying the city 
with, inter alia, "artificial lights * * * as shall be owned 
and controlled by the municipality." Section 10-7-9 fur-
ther provides that: 
mWhenever bonds shall have been issued for the 
purpose of supplying any city or town with arti-
ficial light, water or other public utility, the rates 
of charges for the service of the system or plant 
so constructed may be made sufficient to meet such 
payment's in addition to operating and mainten-
ance expenses and taxes shall be levied to meet any 
deficiencies. 
It is respectfully submitted that in the year 1961, 
Spring City shall have had ample opportunity to amortize 
existing indebtedness to the extent of being fully capable 
of paying, conveniently, and without hardship or excess 
taxation, the bonds in dispute here. 
Clearly the Wilson case, supra, could be given appli-
cation here, particularly where the proceeds of the bond 
issue now disputed have implemented the revenue rais-
ing power, and decreased the necessity for maintenance 
of old facilities of the power and light system, benefited 
by the sale of the instant bonds. 
In Lawrence County vs. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 130 
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Ky. 587, 113 S.W. 824, the court upheld an order of the 
county authorities that a claim during previous years 
should be paid, saying: 
Even if it should be conceded that the claims 
alluded to in the order of the October term of 1906 
of the fiscal court, which is the subject of this suit,, 
were those allowed in 1903 or 1904, it would not 
follow that the order is void. It is not charged, 
nor is it pretended, that the claims allowed in 
1903 or 1904 were in excess of the income or reve-
nues provided for either of those years. It is not 
necessary to the validity of a municipal indebted-
ness that the municipality shall have made pro-
vision for its payment. The inhibition is against 
creating an indebtedness in any year that the 
municipality is unable to pay out its resources for 
that year. If the liabilities incurred, say in 1903, 
did not exceed the income and revenues provided 
by law,—that is, the maximum which under the 
law the county was authorized to levy in taxes,— 
plus any available funds it had on hand, then 
nothing subsequently occurring could render the 
liability void as being in contravention of Section 
157, supra. If the county had collected the taxes 
levied for the purpose of paying its liabilities 
incurred in 1903, but had in some way lost the 
money before it paid its debts, that fact could not 
affect its liabilities. It would remain bound until 
payment, or otherwise legally discharged. See to 
the same effect Camden Clay Co. vs. New Martins-
ville (1910) 67 W. Va. 525, 68 S. E. 118. ' 
The case there cites with approval Scott vs. Salt Lake 
County, supra 58 Utah 25,196 Pac. 1022. 
We submit that if the trial court's decision to the 
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effect that (1) debt may not be protracted to a year other 
than the one in which incurred, and (2) that subsequent 
diversions of funds in the year in which the debt is cre-
ated, even if the subsequent diversions are for necessary 
corporate^ purposes, operate to destroy, abridge, and 
avoid the debt created, then the well known form of com-
mercial obligation, the "tax anticipation" bond or note 
is placed in serious jeopardy. 
That ruling would unseat and disturb numerous 
transactions currently subsisting as valid and enforceable 
obligations. Obligations created in anticipation of taxes 
have become accepted as a form of obtaining short term 
credit for taxing subdivisions, used by practically ever}7 
governmental unit having the power to borrow. They are, 
by definition, a means of temporary financing in anti-
cipation of current taxes, and from the proceeds of which 
the funds derived are to be used for the purposes for 
which the taxes are levied and assessed . 43 Am. Jur, 
Public Securities and Obligations, Sec. 11, 13. If they 
are payable out of taxes to be levied and collected, they 
are "general obligations" of the taxing unit. 43 Am. Jur. 
pp. 493 to 495. If they are general obligations, they are 
a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. 
Fjeldsted vs. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144. "Ob-
ligations created in anticipation of taxes" necessarily 
implies that the taxes are not yet collected—possibly not 
levied and assessed. Clearly the intent in creating that 
debt is for the purpose of obtaining operating revenue 
after current revenues have been found insufficient— 
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payment of which debt is to be made in a year subse-
quent to that in which incurred. 
If the taxing unit could so avoid debt and liability, 
either of the city, or as individual officers of the city, 
they could channel the taxes when collected into other 
funds, budgets, or forms of expenditure or debt, to leave 
no tolerance of current revenue over current expendi-
tures, and then, by a ruling such as has been made in the 
trial court, avoid the consequences of the obligation in-
curred previously. Thereafter, it would not be required 
of the various municipalities, school districts, or counties, 
to pay such debts, but rather it would be required of them 
not to pay those debts. The payment would be the satis-
faction of an unconstitutional obligation, therefore a gift, 
ultra vires, and void. 
Appellant is apprehensive that a rule other than 
the one urged would do violence to existing contracts and 
obligations, disrupt the accepted practices of commercial 
financing adopted by custom and long usage, and corrupt 
the credit of, and the security market for, government 
and its subdivisions. 
We respectfully submit that, the debt being valid 
when created, and there being no objection to protracting 
the time for payment if valid when created, Section 3 of 
Article XIV of the Constitution has not been violated. 
2. The debt limit imposed by Article XIV, Section 4, 
was not exceeded. 
The trial court found that at the time plaintiff pur-
chased the disputed bonds the defendant had outstanding 
general obligations in the sum of $14,500.00. Those obli-
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gations were evidenced by unpaid bonds issued by Spring 
City and held by the plaintiff, the State of Utah. I t found 
that the additional issue of $12,000.00 constituted a debt 
which was in excess of the debt limit which Spring City 
could incur with bond elections. (K. p. 41) The court con-
cluded from that finding that the maximum debt limit of 
Section 4, Article XIV of the Utah Constitution had been 
exceeded. That section reads as follows: 
When authorized to create indebtedness as 
provided in Section 3 of this Article, no county 
shall become indebted to an amount, including ex-
isting indebtedness exceeding two per centum. 
No city, town, -school district or other municipal 
corporation, shall become indebted to an amount, 
including existing indebtedness, exceeding four 
per centum of the value of the taxable property 
therein, the value to be ascertain by the last as-
sessment for State and County purposes, previous 
to the incurring of such indebtedness; except that 
in incorporated cities the assessment shall be taken 
from the last assessment for city purposes; pro-
vided, that no part of the indebtedness allowed in 
this section shall be incurred for other than strict-
ly county, city, town or school district purposes; 
provided further, that any city of the first and 
second class when authorized as provided in Sec-
tion three of this article, may be allowed to incur 
a larger indebtedness, not to exceed four per 
centum and any city of the third class, or town, 
not to exceed eight per centum additional, for 
supplying such city or town with water, artificial 
lights or sewers, when the works for supplying 
such water, light and sewers, shall be owned and 
controlled by the municipality. (As amended No-
vember 8, 1910) 
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The trial court in its findings at page 41 of the Rec-
ord, stated: 
* *
 #
 That at the time plaintiff purchased said 
bonds the plaintiff held unpaid bonds issued by 
Spring City in the sum of $14,500.00. That the 
additional issue of $12,000.00 purchased by plain-
tiff constituted a debt, held by plaintiff, which was 
in excess of the debt limit which Spring City could 
incur with bond elections, all of which it knew or 
should have known. 
The trial court clearly applied the old formula in 
computing the maximum debt limit of the City of Spring 
City, which formula qualified the word "value" in the 
constitutional provision by the word "assessed." Under 
that method of computation, the old formula would limit 
their power to obligate the city to the sum of $21,528.84, 
including existing indebtedness. 
In the case of Board of Education, Rich County 
School District vs. Passey, 246 Pac. 2d 1078, Utah , 
this court said: 
The language of Article XIV, Section 4 is 
clear and unambiguous. It establishes as a debt 
limitation four per centum of the value of the tax-
able property in the district. The word "value" 
is not limited or qualified by any adjectives. It 
does not read "assessed value" or specify any 
other particular kind of value. The word "value" 
standing by itself can have only one meaning, viz, 
the full worth or actual value—not a fractional 
share thereof. 
The constitutional provision above cited (Art. XIV, Sec-
tion 4) provides that a city may incur an original aggre-
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gate indebtedness of four per cent, and an additional 
eight per cent, "for supplying such city or town with 
water, artificial light's or sewers," of the value of the 
taxable property within the corporate limits of the muni-
cipality. In supplying the city with artificial lights the 
defendant Spring City qualified to obligate the city to 
the extent of twelve per cent of the value of the taxable 
property therein, section 4 providing that they may so do 
"when authorized as provided in Section 3 of this Arti-
cle." The qualification of the city under Section 3 has 
been discussed hereinabove in subheading 1. 
If the County Assessor's assessment figure for the 
year 1947 is used as a basis for computing the debt limit 
of Spring City, the city could indebt themselves to an 
amount equal to twelve percent of a figure, forty percent 
of which is $179,407.00, thus making their maximum debt 
limit under Article XIV, Section 4, the sum of $53,822.10. 
Attention of the court is invited to Section 59-5-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended by Chapter 102, 
Laws of Utah, 1947, which provides: 
All taxable property must be assessed at forty 
percent of its reasonable fair cash value. * * * 
It is submitted that this 1947 amendment was merely a 
legislative recognition of a pre-existing condition, of 
which, it is submitted, courts may take judicial knowledge. 
78-25-1 (3) Utah Code Annotated 1953; State Board of 
Land Comrs. vs. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59. It is 
respectfully requested that this court take judicial knowl-
edge of the following records of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, an executive department of this state. 
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From those records, the overall state property tax 
assessments- in the State of Utah were as they appear 
opposite the respective year in which the assessment was 
made: 
1945 $671,281,023.00 
1946 $655,895,447.00 
1947 $681,586,560.00 
1948 $765,371,793.00 
1949 $823,749,300.00 
It will be noted from those figures that the practice of 
assessing property at forty percent of its actual value 
was the customary, common, and accepted practice in 
the State of Utah prior to 1947 inasmuch as there is no 
substantial increase reflected in the assessment for the 
year 1947, nor for subsequent years. It is clear then, that 
the 1947 assessment roll showed that the fair cash value 
of the property within the corporate limits of Spring 
City was an amount, forty percent of which equalled 
$179,407.00. The actual value of the taxable property in 
Spring City, $448,517.50, would permit an aggregate debt 
of $53,822.10, (12% of the value) and some $27,322.10 in 
excess of the then existing indebtedness of Spring City in 
the amount of $14,500.00, together with the debt now dis-
puted in the sum of $12,000.00, and there clearly was no 
violation of the provisions imposing maximum debt con-
tained in Article XIV, Section 4. 
POINT II 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF DEFENDANT SPRING CITY 
WAS AUTHORIZED AND EMPOWERED TO BORROW, UPON 
NEGOTIABLE BONDS, FUNDS TO BE USED FOR CORPOR-
ATE PURPOSES. 
Among the powers and duties of all cities enumerated 
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in Chapter 8, Title 10, there appears the following: 
10-8-2: 
They [city councils of cities] may appropriate 
money for corporate purposes only and provide 
for payment of debts and expenses of the corpora-
tion * * * May purchase, receive, hold property, 
real and personal for the benefit of the city * * * 
improve and protect such property * * * provided 
that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose to 
appropriate money for any purpose which * * * 
will provide for the safety, preserve the health, 
promote the prosperity and improve the morals, 
peace, order, comfort and convenience of the in-
habitants of the city. 
Section 10-8-6 provides: 
They may borrow money on the credit of the 
corporation for corporte purposes in the manner 
and to the extent allowed by the constitution and 
the laws and issue warrants and bonds therefor 
in such amounts and forms and on such conditions 
as they shall determine. 
Section 10-8-14 provides: 
They may construct, maintain and operate 
'* * * electric light works * * *. 
Vol. 43 Am. Jur., Public Securities and Obligation's, Sec-
tion 39, states: 
There are cases undoubtedly in which it is 
proper and desirable that a limited power to issue 
long term, interest bearing negotiable bonds 
should be conferred on a political subdivision, as 
where some extensive public work is to be per-
formed the expense of which is beyond the immedi-
ate resource of reasonable taxation and capable of 
being fairly and justly spread over an extended 
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period of time. # * # Where the power is clearly 
given and securities have been issued in conform-
ity therewith, they will stand on the same basis 
and be entitled to the same privileges as public 
securities and commercial paper generally. 
Section 40 following says: 
# # # rp|ie g e n e r a j power to issue bond's must 
be taken to authorize bonds in the usual form of 
such well known, commercial obligations. 
It is clear from the express wording of the statute and 
the commentaries upon similar statute's that the city 
council of Spring City had authority to issue bonds and 
in accordance with customary and usual form they may 
be long term bonds. There being no constitutional ob-
jection to a city creating debt payable in a subsequent 
year as has been hereinabove considered, there is an ex-
press statutory authority for the issuance of bonds of 
that character. 
POINT III 
IF THE BONDS, SERIES OF JANUARY 15, 1948, BE 
VOID IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ELECTION AUTHORIZING 
THAT ISSUE, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
UPON THE THEORY OF "MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. 
In 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, Fifth Edition, 
page 1547, Section 961, is announced the rule allowing 
recovery by a bondholder on the theory of money had and 
received by the issuer from the purchaser when, for some 
reason, the bonds issued by a municipal corporation are 
void. We quote therefrom: 
If a municipal corporation sells and disposes 
of negotiable instruments purporting to be bonds, 
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the transaction is a loan to the municipality. The 
municipality is in the market as a borrower and 
receives the money in that character, notwith-
standing the transaction assumes the form of a 
sale of its •securities. If it has power to borrow 
money or to incur debt for the purposes for which 
the bonds are issued, and the ground of invalidity 
urged against the bonds is that the city had no 
power to issue bond's which are negotiable in form, 
or that it had not authority to make bonds payable 
in the form and manner adopted, the transaction 
resulting in the transfer of the consideration for 
the issue justifies a recovery against the muni-
cipality as for money of the plaintiff had and re-
ceived by it. The principal upon which a recovery 
has been sustained under such circumstances rs the 
broad obligation to do justice which rests upon all 
persons, natural and artificial; in con-sequence of 
which it has been declared that if a municipality 
obtains the money or property of others without 
authority, the law, independently of any statute, 
will compel restitution or compensation. The ac-
tion is justified under the forms of the common 
law on the ground that it rs an action for money 
of the plaintiff had and received by the municipal-
ity, being money paid by mistake or upon a con-
sideration which happens to fail, or money got 
through imposition. But if the municipality has 
not received any consideration for the issue of the 
bonds, the foundation for an action to recover a 
debt owing by the municipality does not exist, 
and an action by the purchaser or holder of the 
bonds against the municipality will not lie. The 
right to recover against the municipality as for 
money had and received also implies capacity on 
the part of the city to contract debt or to borrow 
money. 
. • . ' ' ' • • " / • 
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The record shows without dispute that the defendant 
Spring City received from the State of Utah for the bonds 
in question the sum of $13,498.67. The record further 
shows that the money thus received was applied by the 
city to purposes for which Spring City may validly ap-
propriate and for which it may properly incur debts. 
Moreover there is no question in this case as to whether 
all parties were acting in good faith under a belief that 
the bonds were valid and proper. If the bonds sued upon 
be void as violative of the Utah Construction, Article 
XIV, Section 3, then it cannot be said but that these 
bonds were issued and purchased upon a mistake made 
by all parties, honestly and in good faith. We believe 
that upon these facts the plaintiff is entitled to restitu-
tion of the money paid apart from the express contract 
on the theory of money had and received, and that the 
better reasoned authorities will support this view. 
The case of Commercial Trust Company of Hagers-
town vs. Laurens County, 267 Fed. 901 (D.C., S.D. Geor-
gia W.D. 1920), is in point. The constitution of Greorgia 
provided, "No such county, municipality, or division shall 
incur any new debt, except for a temporary loan or loans 
to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed 
one-fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of tax-
able property therein, without the assent of two-thirds of 
the qualified voters thereof, at an election for that pur-
pose to be held as prescribed by law." The defendant 
County had incurred a debt totaling $75,000.00 by reso-
lution, on the theory that it was made to meet a "casual 
and temporary deficiency of revenue." One-fifth of one 
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per cent of the assessed valuation of the defendant 
County amounted to $18,720.00. The court, therefore, 
held that the notes evidencing the debt were void. The 
Federal District Court of Georgia held that the holders of 
these notes could recover upon the theory of money had 
and received. We quote from the opinion: 
While, as we have seen, the county could not 
lawfully borrow money to meet these warrants, 
but must wait for the coming in of the taxes laid 
therefor, the loan is void only for the defect of 
power, and is not an act punished by any law. 
The maxim in pari delicto does not apply. While 
the money does not by its mere reception become 
public money, for the treasurer's sureties are not 
even liable for it on his bond (case's cited) nor is 
the treasurer entitled to commissions for handling 
it (cases cited) yet when actually applied by the 
county officers to its lawful use the county be-
comes liable for it, not on any express or inferred 
contract, but ex aequo et bono to the extent only 
that it is so used (cases cited). This remedy seems 
appropriate, where the lender's money is directly 
used by the county through its proper officer^ in 
the extinguishment of lawful claims against the 
county, or in purchases it then might lawfully 
make. 
The district court of the southern district of Florida 
in the case of Olds vs. Town of Bellair, 41 F . Supp. 453, 
(1941) held similarly. The statute creating the defendant 
City gave to that city the power to issue and sell its bonds 
for constructing municipal improvements "Provided, 
such issue and sale of bonds shall be ratified by a major-
ity of the qualified electors of said town who are tax-
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payers and who paid taxes on their own property in the 
town of Bellair Heights, assessed and levied for the cal-
endar year prior to that in which said election is held 
and actually voting in an election to be held for that pur-
pose." The city officials held a bond election before the 
time in which that statute could become operative and is-
sued its bonds based upon that election. The court in 
an action subsequently brought to recover on those bonds 
held that the bonds were void because the law requiring 
an election was not followed. However, it permitted the 
bondholder to recover the actual consideration paid for 
the bonds (in this case they were purchased at a discount) 
on the theory of money had and received because the rec-
ord's showed that the money had been paid by the plain-
tiff, received by the city and expended for purposes with-
in the powers of the city, all in good faith. 
In the case of Bank of Cameron vs. Aleppo Town-
ship, 13 Atl. 2d 40, 338 Penn. 300, (1940), the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania had before it a similar question. 
The constitution of Pennsylvania required that when a 
debt is incurred, an annual tax must be provided suffi-
cient to pay the interest and principal of the debt within 
thirty years. A statute required that the township file 
for public record its financial statement prior to incurring 
debts. These provisions were not complied with when the 
defendant township issued certain negotiable promissory 
note's for the purpose of highway improvement. In an ac-
tion brought to recover the amount of the loan the court, 
in allowing recovery, stated: 
There can be no question that in Pennsyl-
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vania, where a municipality issues an express con 
tract or formal obligation which is void because of 
the failure of its authorities to comply with the 
constitutional and statutory requirement's here in-
volved, an action for money had and received by 
the lender of the money will lie. There is an im-
plied obligation resting upon the municipality 
to pay back what was lent to it in good faith; Oh-
linger v. Maidencreek Township, 312 Pa. 289, 167 
A. 882, 90 A.L.K. 1227. 
The court further announced the same rule in Mc-
Gregor's Estate vs. Young Township, 38 Atl. 2d 313, 350 
Penn. 93, (1949). We quote headnote 6 to that case from 
the Atlantic Keporter: 
Where municipality, such as township, bor-
rowing money, issues express contract or formal 
obligation, which is void because of its authorities' 
failure to comply with constitutional and statutory 
requirements that provision be made for annual 
tax sufficient to pay interest on and principal of 
indebtedness within 30 years and that financial 
statement be filed, action by lender for money had 
and received lies, as implied obligation rests on 
municipality to pay back amount lent to it in good 
faith for lawful purpose. 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of 
Craig, et al vs. Bell, et al, 46 SE 2d 52 (1948), decided a 
•similar question. In that case the trustees of a school 
district had> on the assumption that certain statutes gave 
them the authority, incurred a debt for the purpose of 
constructing a building, and had given therefor its prom-
issory note. The court held that the trustees had no such 
authority but that the holder of the note could recover on 
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the theory of money had and received. We quote headnote 
9 to that case from the Southeastern Reporter: 
Where trustees of school district erroneously 
but in good faith and on advice of school authori-
ties, believed that certain statutes gave them au-
thority to borrow money, and debt of school dis-
trict to lender was incurred in utmost good faith, 
•school district was legally obligated under the 
principle of money had and received, and trustees 
could then legally deliver a new note and substi-
tute it for the invalid note which the lender held. 
In the case of Octonoco County vs. The Town of 
Townsend, 246 NW 410 (Wise. 1933), the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court had before it the question whether, when an 
over-all levy limit is placed on a political subdivision^ 
this limit includes a levy for debt payment. Though this 
question is not exactly in point here, we quote the lan-
guage of the Wisconsin court to show its attitude toward 
municipal debt however it may be incurred : 
The whole trend and history of the decisions 
of this court are as favorable to the collection of 
municipal indebtedness as any system can well be. 
It is thoroughly established in this state that a 
municipality that has received and used the mon-
eys of creditors cannot escape the repayment of 
such moneys because of any invalidity in the bonds 
issued for the payment thereof. 
Under these decisions the municipality is li-
able to any creditors for money had and received 
and anyone who has loaned money to the muni-
cipality which has been received and used by the 
municipality for municipal purposes, may recover 
of the municipality, and the amount of the judg-
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ment so recovered must be placed upon the next 
tax roll and collected with other moneys. 
There are cases denying recovery on the theory ad-
vanced here. The better reasoned of these cases denying 
recovery are on facts not before this court; that is, re-
covery is uniformly denied where the money received for 
the evidences of indebtedness is not used for public pur-
poses or for purposes within the power of the municipal-
ity in the first instance. Other cases deny recovery where 
the debt limit rs exceeded, at least to the extent of such 
excess on the grounds that there is an entire want of 
power in a city to exceed debt limits, regardless of how 
the money is spent. 
This court has had occasion to rule upon the question 
of restoration to the aggrieved party of the consideration 
with which he parted on an invalid contract. In Moe vs. 
Millard County School District, 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980, 
this court allowed fixtures, purchased upon a void con-
tract by the School District, to be removed from the prem-
ises, although stating that they believed them to have 
become annexed to the realty. The court said: 
It might be conceded that most, if not all, of 
the property sought to be removed by this action 
would be classed as fixtures in a contest between 
parties where the application of the rules of law 
governing fixtures was admitted, such as between 
landlord and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee, 
etc. * * * (citing cases) But we cannot see how 
the doctrine of fixtures becomes applicable to this 
case so as to prevent a recovery of the property 
here sought, 
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then again at page 151, of 54 Utah: 
* *
 #
 When it is conceded that the plaintitr 
has no other remedy, [to prevent removal] would 
clearly be a subversion of the purpose for which 
the constitutional and statutory provisions in 
question were framed, and would permit the tax-
payers of the defendant •school district improperly 
because unnecessarily, to shift the burden of the 
education of the children in the district to the 
shoulders of those who in good faith have fur-
nished the material for the completion of the 
school building, to the extent of the value of this 
property, which we think they would not desire, 
nor should they be permitted to do. 
In -so ruling, the court saw fit to abrogate, when 
circumstances such as in this case were present, a settled 
rule of law pertaining to the distinction between real and 
personal property for the movability thereof. 
In the Muir case above cited, the briefs of the pre-
vailing party relief heavily upon the theories of unjust 
enrichment and money had and received. We cite Muir 
vs. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 P. 433, first, for the 
proposition that the obligations themselves were in that 
case validated. We believe the opinion to be clear and un-
ambiguous in holding that the constitutional prohibition 
goes to the amount, and not to the time of payment. 
But we cite the case secondly, alternatively, for the 
theory upon which a portion of the case was argued, and 
possibly decided—that of quantum merit, unjust enrich-
ment, and money had and received. A reference to the 
points upon which the prevailing party in his brief relied 
will indicate as much. The first point was "Municipal 
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Power and Duty to be Honest." The second point was 
"Estoppel," urging: 
A municipality cannot acquire property 
under an invalid contract and plead the invalidity 
as a defeirse, and also retain the property. 
And in the conclusion: 
From the authorities cited, it is seen that 
courts grant relief in cases like this, upon the 
; ground of money had and received, estoppel or 
ratification, but more often upon the principle of 
justice, scjuare dealing and equity. 
(All citations to briefs in Muir vs. Murray City, 
supra, taken from volume 277, Abstracts and Briefs 
[cases No. 3356-3374], Utah State Library). 
We respectfully submit that the facts before this 
court warrant recovery by the plaintiff against Spring 
City in any event for the money paid to Spring City 
for its bonds issued January 15, 1948. The city received 
the money from the state, all parties acting in good 
faith. Moreover the city had the power to incur such 
debt, and the authority to expend moneys for the pur-
poses the money so received was expended. Justice, 
equity and good conscience are in favor of the plaintiff, 
and Spring City should not in good conscience be 
allowed to keep the money so received and the benefits 
therefrom derived and at the same time escape liability 
on the debt thus created because an election was not 
held. 
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POINT IV 
IF THE BOND ISSUE IS VOID, THE PLAINTIFF MAY 
RECOVER AGAINST THE ISSUING AUTHORITIES BE-
CAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THOSE OFFICIALS IN 
AUTHORIZING THE ISSUE. 
The bonds in issue recite: 
It is hereby further certified, recited and 
declared that all conditions, acts, and things 
essential to the validity of this bond exist, have 
happened and have been done, and that every 
requirement of law affecting the issue thereof has 
been duly complied with, and that this bond is 
within every debt and other limits prescribed by 
the Constitution and laws of said State and that 
the full faith and credit of said Spring City are 
hereby irrevocably pledged to the punctual pay-
ment of the principal and interest of this bond 
according to its terms. 
This representation is also contained in the minutes 
of the action taken by Spring City authorizing this issue, 
and these minutes show that all the then city officials 
voted for such issue. By this very act and by offering 
these bonds to purchasers, these officials were represent-
ing that all necessary steps had been taken to constitute 
these bonds valid and binding general obligation's of 
Spring City. That is, these city officials were represent-
ing to any and all prospective purchasers that the bonds 
were issued only after "every requirement of law affect-
ing the issue thereof was properly complied with and 
that these bonds were "within every debt and other 
limits prescribed by the Constitution and laws of" the 
State of Utah. 
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Furthermore, the record shows (Plaintiff's Exhibh 
A), that a financial statement in the form of an affidavit 
was executed January 8, 1948, -signed by the defendant 
Henry Blain, as City Recorder, and bearing the seal of 
Spring City, which affidavit recites that the assessed 
valuation of Spring City for the year 1947, as equalized, 
was $179,407.00. This affidavit further recited that the 
outstanding general obligation bonded indebtedness of 
Spring City was at that time $9,500.00, and that the 
anticipated revenue for Spring City for 1948 was in 
excess of $15,434.92. 
The plaintiff as a prospective bond purchaser relied 
upon these representations and we believe that plaintiff 
was entitled to rely thereon. If^  these facts and con-
clusions set forth in the representations were not true, 
then the plaintiff bondholder may possibly, on legal 
principles, be denied recovery as against the Spring City 
corporation. However, it is our position that, if these 
representations were not true, there was a duty upon 
the then mayor, councilmen and recorder to ascertain, 
before authorizing the bond issue and selling it, that 
they were not true. That is, we believe that a city council 
when creating a debt of the city has a duty, not only to 
the city, but to prospective bond purchasers to repre-
sent the facts of the financial condition of the city and 
of the steps taken preparatory to the selling of its bonds, 
and this duty is not to act negligently. In this case, J £ 
the facts are not as represented, these city officials 
acted negligently in their duty toward plaintiff as a 
prospective bond purchaser, and the plaintiff, therefore, 
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should recover for the damages caused by such negli-
gent representations. 
In the case of First National Bank of Key West vs. 
Filer et al. (Fla, 1933), 145 So. 204, 87 A.L.E. 267, the 
Florida Supreme Court has so held. In that case a 
board of public instruction, without authority and "with-
out an affirmative vote of the qualified voters being first 
had and obtained" purchased a school site, and in part 
payment thereof executed and delivered three notes for 
$2,000 each. The notes had not been paid, an action had 
been brought earlier thereon, and they had been declared 
void. In this case the holder of the notes proceeded 
against the members of the board personally on the 
theory that they were individually liable therefor. The 
Supreme Court of Florida allowed recovery on the 
theory that the individual members of the board by 
issuing the notes without authority to bind the board 
thereby, were personally liable in tort to the holder. We 
quote from the case: 
In the case at bar, there was a clear legal 
duty on the defendants, as members of the board 
of public instruction of Dade County, to proceed 
in a particular way with respect to the issuance 
of evidences of indebtedness for the purchase of 
school sites. This clear legal duty to proceed in 
a particular way to comply with the statutes 
implied an equally clear legal duty not to proceed 
in any other way, and not to issue evidences of 
indebtedness, apparently valid on their face and 
having the seal of the board of public instructions 
attached thereto, unless the conditions warrant-
ing such issuance, had been ascertained by them 
beforehand to exist. 
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The duty to comply with the indispensable 
legal formalities required to be observed in the 
issuance of public securities and evidences of 
indebtedness, in order to. make them valid and 
bind the corporate body or board so issuing them, 
is ministerial and non-discretionary in character. 
A neglect of that duty by proceeding in a manner 
in disregard of the law and to the •special damage 
of another not a contributor to the default there-
fore renders the participants in such illegal con-
duct liable in damages to the person specially / 
injured by such omission or neglect. * * * 
Ij^the facts as represented to the plaintiff bond 
purchaser were not correct, and the bonds therefore 
declared void, then either the purchaser or the city will 
suffer a loss. Those causing such loss, we submit, should, 
where it is caused by their negligence, be compelled to 
make the damaged person whole. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's finding that there was neither negligence nor 
misrepresentation on the part of the several individual 
defendants who were officers of the defendant Spring 
City at the time of the disputed issue. The bonds them-
selves as well as the preliminary proceedings authoriz-
ing their issue disclose a representation which, if these 
bonds are held invalid, was false and prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. In the First National Bcmk case above cited, 
there arose a duty upon those individuals to ascertain 
the facts they represented and a presumption that if the 
facts as represented were false, there was a liability 
in tort to the holder. There is nothing in the record 
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which would overcome that presumption if in fact these 
bonds are declared to be void. 
We especially take exception to the court's finding 
(E. p. 42), that the defendants were entitled to rely upon 
the opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Utah. 
The Attorney General stood in somewhat of an adversary 
position, not as counsel for any of the defendants. 
Neither were the defendants protected in their reliance 
upon their bond brokers or his attorney. Those defend-
ants procured their counsel and if it was incompetent, 
they, not their adversary, must suffer adversely from 
an unfortunate choice. 
We further except to the court's finding that the 
plaintiff knew or should have known the financial con-
dition of defendant Spring City (E, p. 41, para's 1 and 2). 
We can find no authority for the proposition that one 
department of the state is charged with constructive 
notice of the acts, conditions, records and affairs of 
another department. It would be an onerous burden to 
charge each department of government with the acts 
and records of every other department. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and Appellant respectfully contends in sum-
mary and conclusion, that the bonds subject of this liti-
gation are constitutional, valid, and collectible. That 
there has been no violation of the provisions of the Con-
stitution or of the enabling laws of the State of Utah. 
The bonds are not invalid, we contend, for reason 
of exceeding the provision for maximum debt of Article 
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XIV, Section 3. That at the time of their issuance, they 
were within the potential and expected revenues of the 
defendant Spring City for the year in which they were 
issued. That being valid when issued, they remained 
valid and subsisting general obligations of the municipal-
ity, although payable in years other than the one in 
which the obligation was incurred. They were not, nor 
could they be, invalidated by subsequent appropriations, 
expenditures, or disbursements of the municipality dur-
ing the year in which they were issued. 
We respectfully contend that the bonds were issued 
pursuant to an express statutory authority, which addi-
tionally empowered the municipality to collect revenues 
for the satisfaction of the debt. 
Plaintiff and Appellant further submits that for 
money had and received, the Defendant Spring City 
ought to be required to repay the full amount paid for 
the disputed bonds, including interest and premium; 
that the restoration sought may be properly ordered 
upon sound principles of the law of restitution, allow-
ing a damaged party to be compensated for amounts 
by which another has been unjustly enriched by money 
had and received. 
It is respectfully urged and contended that, if the 
bonds be held invalid, then the Plaintiff and Appellant 
ought to be entitled to recover the amount of their 
damage from the individual defendants herein, who were, 
at the time of the issuance of those bonds, officers of 
the defendant Spring City, for reason of their negligent 
misrepresentations and recitals as the same were con-
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tained in the proceedings preliminary to the issuance of, 
and as contained in, the bonds, and for reason of their 
failure to so manage the affairs of the city so as to retain 
as valid and subsisting obligations, the securities in 
which they had recited and covenanted that the evidences 
of debt were lawfully and constitutionally issued, and 
within current revenues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
- Attorney General 
S.D. HUFFAKER 
Deputy Attorney General 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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